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Abstract Tarski avoids the liar paradox by relativizing truth and falsehood to par-
ticular languages and forbidding the predication to sentences in a language of truth or
falsehood by any sentences belonging to the same language. The Tarski truth-schemata
stratify an object-language and indefinitely ascending hierarchy of meta-languages in
which the truth or falsehood of sentences in a language can only be asserted or denied
in a higher-order meta-language. However, Tarski’s statement of the truth-schemata
themselves involve general truth functions, and in particular the biconditional, defined
in terms of truth conditions involving truth values standardly displayed in a truth table.
Consistently with his semantic program, all such truth values should also be relativ-
ized to particular languages for Tarski. The objection thus points toward the more
interesting problem of Tarski’s concept of the exact status of truth predications in a
general logic of sentential connectives. Tarski’s three-part solution to the circularity
objection which he anticipates is discussed and refuted in detail.
Keywords Circularity · Language, meta-language · Semantics ·
Tarski, Alfred · Truth
1 Tarski’s Semantic Conception of Truth
To avoid the liar paradox, Alfred Tarski proposes to relativize truth predications to
particular formalized languages. Assertions and denials of the truth of sentences are
restricted from being made within the same language to which the sentences belong,
but are permitted only in higher-order meta-languages (Tarski 1983).
Tarski’s truth-schemata are not intended to provide an analysis of the general con-
cept of truth, but rather of truth-in-a-formalized-language-L . The schemata can be
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formulated in this fashion, organized in an indefinitely ascending hierarchy of object-





“‘p’ is trueL1 ↔ p’ is trueL2 ↔ [‘p’ is trueL1 ↔ p]’ is trueL3 Meta-language 3
↔ [“p’ is trueL1 ↔ p’ is trueL2 ↔ [‘p’ is trueL1 ↔ p]]
“p’ is trueL1 ↔ p’ is trueL2 ↔ [‘p’ is trueL1 ↔ p] Meta-language 2
‘p’ is trueL1 ↔ p Meta-language 1
p Object-language O
At the object-language level there is as yet no truth predication, according to Tarski,
but only sentences in which no truth or falsehood predicates occur. If the language
contained its own truth predicate, contrary to Tarski’s restriction, then it would be
possible within that language to construct a liar sentence denying its own truth or
asserting its own falsehood, and thereby jeopardizing the language’s classical bivalent
semantic integrity. The simplest form of the Tarski truth schema appears at the level of
meta-language 1, in which it is possible to predicate truth or falsehood of sentences in
the lower object-language. The Tarski schema, for obvious reasons, is also sometimes
misleadingly described as a disquotational, redundancy, or correspondence analysis of
truth relative to the meta-language in which truth predications are asserted or denied of
sentences in the object-language or lower-order meta-languages in the hierarachy. The
identical schema is replicated in all higher-order meta-languages m + 1, by uniformly
substituting for sentence p in the meta-language 1 truth schema the truth predications
permitted in lower-order meta-language m (m > 1).
2 The Circularity Problem
The essentials of Tarskian truth schemata are well-known.1 A circularity threatens
Tarski’s proposal for understanding the concept of truth in formalized languages
nevertheless, of which Tarski is well aware and which he tries to address.2
1 Here I follow standard practice in symbolizing Tarski’s biconditional truth schema, suggested also by
Donald Davidson’s modification of the principle as the so-called T -schema, ‘Truth and Meaning’ [1967],
reprinted in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1984), where Davidson
writes, p. 23: ‘The theory will have done its work if it provides, for every sentence s in the language under
study, a matching sentence (to replace “p”) that, in some way yet to be made clear, “gives the meaning”
of s. One obvious candidate for matching sentence is just s itself, if the object-language is contained in the
meta-language; otherwise a translation of s in the meta-language. As a final bold step, let us try treating the
position occupied by “p” extensionally: to implement this, sweep away the obscure “means that”, provide
the sentence that replaces “p” with a proper sentential connective, and supply the description that replaces
“s” with its own predicate. The plausible result is / (T )s is T [true] if and only if p. / What we require
of a theory of meaning for a language L is that without appeal to any (further) semantical notions it place
enough restrictions on the [truth] predicate “is T ” to entail all sentences got from schema T when “s” is
replaced by a structural description of a sentence of L and “p” by that sentence.’
2 Criticisms of Tarski’s truth convention are offered by Field (1972), Gupta (1993), Halbach (1999),
Hintikka (1975), Ketland (1999).
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The problem is that the truth functional biconditional appears innocently in these
formalizations as though it were a logically neutral way of relating the truth conditions
of propositions relativized to object- and meta-languages in the Tarskian hierarchy.
The biconditional itself is nevertheless a relation that is defined and enters into philo-
sophical semantics for interpretation as a truth-function, the very formal interpretation
of which presupposes the concept of truth. We see this unmistakably in the ordinary
truth table definition by cases of the biconditional, by which a biconditional is true
(T) (the biconditional truth function yields output T) just when its component (input)
sentences both have truth value true (T) or both have truth value false (F).
It is standard to excuse the use of truth functions like the biconditional in analyzing
the concept of truth as meta-logical or meta-linguistic, as belonging more particularly
to a meta-language in which the requirements of true propositions are spelled out. Such
a ploy is particularly unacceptable, however, in the context of Tarski’s explication of
truth conditions for propositions in formalized languages, which is already stratified
into an object-language and meta-language hierarchy, where it seems to involve
Tarski’s theory in vicious circularity.
Tarski considers the sentence p (‘Snow is white’) as belonging to an object-
language, and then requires that the sentence in which truth is predicated of p belong
to a higher-order meta-language, sanctioning the occurrence of the biconditional (‘iff’
or ↔ in formalizations) as common to any truth or falsehood predication in the meta-
language hierarchy, as well as in non-atomic object-language sentences that happen
to be biconditional in logical form. As we have seen, there is no such thing as simple
univocal truth if Tarski’s theory is correct, but only truth-in-a-given-meta-language-Li
for a certain object-language or lower-level meta-language Li−1. If there is no such
thing as simple univocal truth, nor a general analysis of the concept of truth, however,
then there are equally no simple univocal truth functions, for each truth function is
defined by reference to truth condition cases, expressed as T and F combinations,
as in the standard truth tables for the five most common truth functions— negation,
conjunction, inclusive disjunction, material conditional, and biconditional. If Tarski’s
relativized theory of truth in formalized languages is correct, then it is mistaken to
read T in a standard truth table as representing truth simpliciter. We cannot refer to
truth, falsehood, or truth values generally, according to Tarski’s concept of truth in
formalized languages, so we should not be able to do so even in an elementary truth
table, if a general analysis of the concept of truth on pain of logical-semantic paradox is
supposed to be unavailable. Instead, we can only consistently speak of truth-or-false-
hood-in-a-given-meta-language-Li for the sentences appearing in an object-language
or lower-level meta-language Li−1.
Thus, in ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’, Tarski explicitly avails
himself of stock truth functional connectives in symbolic logic and their natural lan-
guage equivalents in order to formulate his truth-schemata. There, for example, he
maintains:
Among the expressions of the metalanguage we can distinguish two kinds. To
the first belong expressions of a general logical character, drawn from any suf-
ficiently developed system of mathematical logic [Tarski’s italics; he refers in
the footnote here to Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica]…To the
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same category belongs a series of analogous expressions from the domain of the
sentential calculus, of the first order functional calculus and of the calculus of
classes, for example, ‘if …, then’, ‘and’, ‘if and only if’, ‘for some x’ (or ‘there
is an x such that …’), ….3
Applying the standard apparatus of sentential or propositional logic, Tarski proceeds
to formulate his treatment of truth conditions relative to a language, first intuitively:
In order to explain the sense of this phrase we consider the following scheme:
for all a, a satisfies the sentential function x if and only if p
and substitute in this scheme for ‘p’ the given sentential function (after first
replacing the free variable occurring in it by ‘a’) and for ‘x’ some individual
name of this function. Within colloquial language we can in this way obtain, for
example, the following formulation:
for all a, a satisfies the sentential function ‘x is white’ if and only if a is white
(and from this conclude, in particular, that snow satisfies the function ‘x is
white).4
And then in terms of a concept of a satisfaction set somewhat more rigorously
defined in terms of the calculus of classes:
Definition 25 x is a correct (true) sentence in the individual domain a if and only if
x ∈ S and every infinite sequence of sub-classes of the class a satisfies the sentence x
in the individual domain a.5
Although the implication has not been widely acknowledged, if strictly carried into
practice, Tarski’s theory of truth requires a parallel hierarchy of truth table defini-
tions for an indefinitely ascending hierarchy of truth functions. This means that for
Tarski there is equally no simple univocal negation, conjunction, disjunction, condi-
tional, or biconditional, but rather, only, for example, ↔-in-a-given-object-or-meta-
language-Li , for all the object- and meta-languages required by Tarski’s concept of
truth, Lo, . . ., Ln, . . . . When Tarski appeals to the biconditional to express the corre-
spondence relation whereby a sentence ‘p’ is trueL iff (↔)p, the relation should be
formulated: ‘p’ is trueLi ↔ j p, where it remains to be seen whether i = j or i = j
(and, if the latter, whether i > j or i < j). Thus, Tarski’s definition of the concept
of truth-in-a-given-language-L in the above formulation presupposes the very same
concept of truth-in-a-given-language-L that is presupposed in the truth table definition
of the truth function ↔L . As an epistemic indication of the account’s circularity, we
must already know what it means to speak of true-in-L in order to understand the
appropriately linguistically relativized truth function ↔L , by which the concept of
true-in-L in strict adherence to Tarski’s conclusions needs to be defined.
3 Tarski, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, 170-171.
4 Ibid, p. 190.
5 Ibid, p. 200.
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3 Tarski’s Three-Part Solution
Tarski anticipates precisely this criticism in his 1944 essay, ‘The Semantic Conception
of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics’. In section II, Polemical Remarks, Tarski
describes and attempts to refute what he calls ‘a typical example’ of an objection ‘to
the semantic conception of truth in general’ (Tarski 1944). Tarski writes:
In formulating the definition we use necessarily sentential connectives, i.e.,
expressions like “if…, then,” “or,” etc. They occur in the definiens; and one
of them, namely, the phrase “if, and only if” is usually employed to combine the
definiendum with the definiens. However, it is well known that the meaning of
sentential connectives is explained in logic with the help of the words “true” and
“false”; for instance, we say that an equivalence, i.e., a sentence of the form “p if,
and only if, q,” is true if either both of its members, i.e., the sentences represented
by ‘p’ and ‘q,’ are true or both are false. Hence the definition involves a vicious
circle.6
Tarski’s reply to the objection has three parts, none of which in the end seems
decisive or adequate to withstand higher counter-criticisms.
(1) Tarski begins by trying to allay concern about the objection on the grounds
that any effort to formally explicate a concept of truth would find itself in the same
sinking boat. He explains: ‘If this objection were valid, no formally correct definition
of truth would be possible; for we are unable to formulate any compound sentence
without using sentential connectives, or other logical terms defined with their help.
Fortunately, the situation is not so bad.’7
It is a platitude among logicians interested in philosophical argument to say that
one thinker’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. Tarski favors the modus tol-
lens side on this issue, although he does not simply conclude that the objection must
be invalid on the grounds that we somehow know in advance that a formally correct
definition of truth must be possible. Nevertheless, in keeping with the rhetorical bur-
den of the polemical remarks in this section of the essay, Tarski casts a first ray of
suspicion on the objection by suggesting that it would be too strong if correct, since it
would exclude any proposal for formally defining a concept of truth regardless of the
definition’s content. The whole enterprise of trying to clarify the semantics of truth in
any context and by any means is accordingly placed in doubt.
As already indicated, this is precisely the conclusion disparaging purely formal
explications of the concept of truth that we have maintained must be taken seriously,
as our modus ponens stands in opposition to Tarski’s modus tollens. The implication
then is that there cannot be a formal semantic definition of the concept of truth, a
conclusion that can be philosophically supported on a number of grounds. Tarski rec-
ognizes the general threat to a formal semantics of truth conditions especially as an
adequacy criterion for definitions of truth. The difference is that Tarski believes that





in axiomatized formal languages rather than in a language interpreted in the sense
of model theory. To rescue the semantics of truth from the objection that the defini-
tion relies on interpreted truth functions Tarski’s defense therefore boils down to the
remaining two components of his reply.
(2) Tarski next confronts the circularity objection head-on, arguing that definitions
of the truth functional connectives in terms of a prior concept of truth is a superflu-
ous meta-linguistic superaddition to a formal logical system considered strictly and
correctly as such. He continues:
It is undoubtedly the case that a strictly deductive development of logic is often
preceded by certain statements explaining the conditions under which sentences
of the form “if p, then q,” etc., are considered true or false. (Such explanations
are often given schematically, by means of the so-called truth-tables.) However,
these statements are outside of the system of logic, and should not be regarded
as definitions of the terms involved. They are not formulated in the language of
the system, but constitute rather special consequences of the definition of truth
given in the metalanguage (Tarski 1944).
Tarski’s strategy is interesting, but not obviously satisfactory. He acknowledges that
truth table definitions of the propositional truth functional connectives often herald a
‘strictly deductive development of logic’, but he argues that such definitions do not
belong to the system of logic whose formal expression they appear to prepare. He
invokes the object-language meta-language distinction to preserve a formal system
of logic belonging to the object-language from a circularity that he implies can only
threaten a semantic concept of truth if object- and meta-languages are thoughtlessly
conflated and confused.
That there is a distinction between logic as an axiomatic object-language and its
meta-languages is not under dispute. The question is rather whether and in what sense
the distinction helps Tarski to avoid the objection that there is a vicious circularity in
the use of truth functional propositional connectives to define the concept of truth rel-
ativized to formal languages. The objection, first of all, is not that there is a circularity
in the object-language of symbolic logic, but that there is a circularity specifically
within the meta-language that purports to articulate adequacy criteria for true sen-
tences belonging to the object-language. Tarski declares that truth table definitions of
the truth functional propositional connectives are not part of the object-language of
logic, and so they are not. However, the circularity of concern in the objection under
consideration is internal to the object-language’s semantic meta-language in which
the concept of truth is supposed to be formally defined for the object-language.
There might be relief from the circularity if we could have a meta-language in which
the truth of sentences in an object- or lower-level meta-language were defined that was
distinct from the meta-language in which the essential truth functional propositional
connective, in particular, the biconditional, ↔, is defined. However, a moment’s reflec-
tion shows that the meta-language Mn+1 of object- or meta-language Ln , in which
a truth functional propositional connective is defined for Ln , cannot be distinct from
the meta-language in which the truth of sentences belonging to Ln is defined. Thus, if
Mn+1 is the meta-language in which the truth of sentences in object- or meta-language
Ln is defined, then the truth functional propositional connectives occurring in Ln must
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also be defined in Mn+1, and not in some other meta-language = Mn+1. The reason
is clear when we appreciate the fact that a propositional connective could not possibly
be understood as a truth function involving sentences belonging to another language
than that for which the connective is defined.
Suppose, then, as before, that Mn+1 is the meta-language of object- or meta-
language Ln , and that ↔ is defined for Ln in Mn+1. When we ask whether the truth
conditions for sentences connected by ↔ in Ln could be defined in some other lan-
guage than Mn+1, it should be immediately clear that the answer is no; for if they
were, then even in principle the potential truth values of sentences connected by ↔
would be unavailable for input to the truth function within Mn+1. If truth values and
the definitions of truth functional connectives are relativized to specific formalized
languages, as Tarski proposes, then no language can define a connective such as ↔
in a formalized language Ln if it cannot at the same time make reference to available
language-relativized truth conditions for sentences belonging to Ln .
If we try to save the situation by maintaining that Mn+1 could be distinct from
another meta-language Mn+2 or M∗n+1 of Ln , which, as the alternative notation indi-
cates, may or may not be stratified relative to Mn+1, but are in any case ostensibly
different from it, in which the truth conditions for sentences connected by ↔ in Ln
are separately defined but still available to Mn+1 for purposes of defining ↔ and other
truth functional propositional connectives in Ln , then Mn+1 effectively contains all
the relevant information vouchsafed by Mn+2 or M∗n+1, and in that respect Mn+1 and
Mn+2 or M∗n+1 relevantly coincide. There is but one meta-language of Ln in that case
and at least in that limited respect through which ↔ is defined for sentences in Ln .
Such an overlap of available information and one-way referencing concerning the
semantic status of sentences in a language subordinate to a meta-language in which a
propositional connection such as ↔ is nevertheless sufficient to embroil Tarski in the
circularity objection he is hoping to avoid. Tarski believes that the hierarchy of object-
and meta-languages provides a route of escape from the circularity objection, but he
seems not to consider the exact information required within a meta-language in order
to define the relevant semantic properties of a subordinate language, which is all that
is needed for the circularity problem to arise.
(3) Tarski next offers another defense of his semantic conception of truth in response
to the circularity objection. He now maintains:
Moreover, these statements do not influence the deductive development of logic
in any way. For in such a development we do not discuss the question of whether
a given statement is true, we are only interested in the problem whether it is
provable.8
Tarski, interestingly, also maintains in this third part of his defense against the cir-
cularity objection that in the deductive development of logic, as quoted above, ‘we do
not discuss the question of whether a given sentence is true, we are only interested in




There is sense in which Tarski is obviously correct, particularly if we think of an
axiomatized deductive system in purely formalist terms entirely as an uninterpreted
symbol manipulation game. There is much to recommend such an approach to logic,
just as there is in Hilbertian philosophy of mathematics. Requirements of provability
can be stipulatively configured for a logic’s syntax, with no consideration for the actual
truth values of the propositions that enter into deductive derivations of one set of wffs
from another.
If ‘deduction’ is intended here as it generally meant in logical theory, however, then
there is another respect in which the concept of truth enters indispensably into the the-
ory and practice of deductively valid inference. We cannot intelligibly define deduction
as any rule-governed syntax transformation we please, for then we could allow any
recognized inferential fallacy as a deductively valid proof. Instead, the formal deri-
vation of sentences within a formalized language is constrained by the necessity of
being truth-preserving. Thereby the concept of truth, including its applications in syn-
tactically considered deductively valid proof, involving the biconditional among other
truth functional propositional connectives, defined in effectively the same meta-lan-
guage or relevantly overlapping fragments of distinct meta-languages referentially or
in other ways informationally interconnected, remains ineluctably entangled in vicious
circularity.
The fact, if it is a fact, that we appear to be interested only in the question of prov-
ability in the deductive development of logic does not thereby remove the concept of
truth from consideration of the deductively valid derivation of proofs. It is only by
virtue of and with tacit reference to our background understanding of the truth-pre-
serving requirements of deductively valid inference that we can intelligibly speak of
proof and provability in formalized languages. If we eliminate the concept of truth,
then we equally eliminate the possibility of deductively valid proof.
Tarski has it partly right when he concludes in this part of his countercriticism of
the circularity objection:
…the moment we find ourselves within a deductive system of logic — or of
any discipline based upon logic, e.g., of semantics — we either treat sentential
connectives as undefined terms, or else we define them by means of other sen-
tential connectives, but never by means of semantic terms like “true” or “false”.
For instance, if we agree to regard the expressions “not” and “if…, then” (and
possibly also “if, and only if”) as undefined terms, we can define the term “or”
by stating that a sentence of the form “p or q” is equivalent to the corresponding
sentence of the form “if not p, then q.” The definition can be formulated, e.g., in
the following way:
(p or q) if, and only if, (if not p, then q)
This definition obviously contains no semantic terms.9
What Tarski says here is perfectly true, but it does not necessarily support the con-
clusion he needs to sustain in order to avoid the circularity objection. It is correct
9 Ibid.
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to observe that we do not as a rule explicitly use, although neither are we prevented
from explicitly using, semantic terminology in working competently with the usual
sentential connectives.
Looking anthropologically at what logicians actually do in practice, it is reason-
able to remark as Tarski does that sentential connectives are treated either as undefined
terms or else defined in relation to other sentential connectives. The fact that we take
these purely syntactical shortcuts in using a logical symbolism need not stand in doubt.
The deeper question is nevertheless whether we can possibly be justified in doing so
without at least implicit reference to the truth conditions of propositions whereby the
syntactical equivalences among the propositional connectives are legitimized.
After we become familiar with the use of a logical symbolism we can use its terms
and operators without thought as to their semantic underpinning. The propositions for-
mulated in a logical symbolism are nevertheless interrelated by virtue of their meaning.
It is surely no accident that the development of logical formalisms generally takes the
trouble to introduce the propositional connectives by means of truth tables, to which
appeal can be made at any stage as a check on illicit inferences and syntax transforma-
tions. If absolutely all of the propositional connectives are treated as undefined, then
there is no point at which meaning enters the symbolism, and no point at which we can
explain why the material conditional and disjunction with negation can be logically
interdefined. If we try to say that the equivalence Tarski mentions, [p ∨q] ↔ [¬p →
q], is purely stipulative, then, setting aside the trivial and universally acknowledged
conventionality of one over another choice of notation, we deprive logic of its semantic
grounding as a system of functions on true or false propositions.
There is a reason why [p ∨ q] ↔ [¬p → q] supports the replacement and trans-
formation of p ∨ q by and to ¬p → q, and not by or to p → q or ¬p ∧ ¬q,
and so on, and the reason has to do with the definition of the propositional connec-
tives in terms of their truth conditions. Whether or not we mention these foundational
semantic relations in getting on with the business of using formal symbolic logic to
develop a deductive system and its applications, after we have developed a level of
comfort and facility with the formalism, does not change the fact that propositional
logic contains no equivalences, contrary to Tarski’s formalistic avowal, if either all
of the propositional connectives are not merely treated as but are in fact undefined
terms or reductively related in a chain of transformational syntactical equivalences
that ultimately rest on undefined terms. Logic at its propositional root is about the
interrelation of possibilities among the truth-valued expressions of thought, and as
such is implicitly throughout its superstructure permeated by the concept of truth.
Finally, Tarski offers the following general considerations on the requirements for
a definition to embody a vicious circularity:
However, a vicious circle in definition arises only when the definiens contains
either the term to be defined itself, or other terms defined with its help. Thus we
clearly see that the use of sentential connectives in defining the semantic term




This, too, is absolutely true as far as it goes. The trouble is that when we leave
truth out of the picture entirely, not merely relying on our informal background under-
standing of the truth conditions of the propositional connectives in considering the
meaning of efforts to explicate the semantics of truth, then we are left at best with an
incomplete account of the concept’s meaning. Lacking this, we can reasonably say
that the concept has not actually been defined at all. If relying exclusively on formal
methods in logic we find ourselves unable to define a concept such as the truth of a
sentence in a formalized language, then we should be mindful of the limitations and
skeptical about the prospects of elaborating a purely formal semantic concept of truth.
Consider the analogous situation in which we try to define ‘A’ in terms of ‘B’ in
A =d f B, but where ‘B’ itself is altogether meaningless. We may try to take comfort,
as Tarski evidently does, in the fact that the definiens in a formal semantic definition
of truth relativized to a formalized language does not contain the term featured in the
definiendum, or ‘other terms defined with its help’. If, however, we cannot fully or
properly understand the definiens without appealing at least implicitly to an under-
standing of the concept represented by the definiendum term, then we are equally
ensnared in vicious circularity.
4 Limitations of Purely Formal Truth Definitions
What are the implications of Tarski’s use of truth functions to define a semantic concep-
tion of truth? The circularity that appears to threaten Tarski’s project has not seemed to
worry subsequent generations of logicians and philosophers of language. The expla-
nation may have to do in part with a widespread faith that a solution must be available
in a proper application of the object-language and meta-language distinction, and in
the fact that Tarski was aware of the difficulty and had answered it satsifactorily. Yet
the problem is not easily dismissed and poses a genuine threat to any effort to provide
a purely formal definition of truth.
Struggling against the manifest vacuity of a mere coherence net of inter-defined
terms, in which a vicious circularity is rightly sensed, Tarski resists, not, like other
theorists, by invoking a category of unexplicated primitive concepts, whose meaning
is informally understood, and whose application might be conveyed in other ways
outside the system of definitions. Such a solution is unacceptable to Tarski, and meth-
odologically unavailable to his philosophical project of providing a purely formal
semantic characterization of truth in formalized languages, which cannot rely on what
we know informally about basic concepts behind the scenes. Instead, he proposes to
avoid the specter of circularity by boldly appealing to concepts that he maintains have
no meaning at all within the specific language in which they occur and in which their
definition appears. If this is well in keeping with Tarski’s formalist ideology, then, we
might conclude, so much the worse for formalism. Tarski may have consistency on his
side, but at its altar he sacrifices completeness. The truth-valuational meaning of the
propositional connectives is supposed to be only meta-linguistically definable, but we
have seen that invoking the object- versus meta-language ploy offers no safe escape
from vicious implicit circularity in Tarski’s use of truth functions in the semantic def-
inition of truth. It is hard to appreciate how the general expectation that ex nihilo nihil
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fit is supposed to find exception in the effort to define a semantic conception of truth
as relying on terms that are literally meaningless within the language in which the
definition is formulated.
Tarski cannot hope to avoid commitment to a semantic account of truth func-
tions, for they are, after all truth functions, and Tarski recognizes the need to articulate
a semantic conception of truth. He proposes adequacy criteria for a definition of truth
as preparation for his definition of truth as a semantic concept. Truth he defines by
means of the biconditional, and although the word ‘true’ does not explicitly appear
in the definiens, as Tarski rightly remarks, the concept of truth is presupposed by
the proper application of the biconditional as a truth function, a function with truth
valued propositions as inputs and outputs. We cannot break the circle by trying to
treat the propositional connectives as uninterpreted purely syntactical inscription
types, nor does the object- versus meta-language distinction avail, for the circular-
ity belongs entirely to the meta-language. The circularity is inherent in any effort
to work out a purely formal semantic definition of truth, and the purely syntacti-
cal theory of truth functions is perhaps the least convincing component of Tarski’s
program. It demonstrates a desperate but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to cope
with the circularity involved in using truth functions or truth value defined prop-
ositional connectives to define the concept of truth. The same problem does not
similarly affect other non-purely-formal efforts to define the concept of truth, as
a contribution to the larger project of developing a semantics for formal symbolic
logic. It is rather an encumbrance specific to the kind of definition of truth that Tar-
ski proposes, in which adequacy conditions are spelled out exclusively formally in
terms of the correspondence between names for sentences and the facts the sentences
represent.
Nor can Tarski escape from the problem by stipulating that ‘p’ is trueLi ↔L j p,
where i = j . The reason is that, intuitively, if sentence p belongs to language Li , then,
on the assumption that there are no universally general truth functions just as there is
no universally general concept of truth, any sentence logically equivalent to p must
also belong to Li . However, p is logically equivalent, as we would express it outside
of a Tarskian truth hierarchy framework, to p ↔ p, and this in turn is logically
equivalent to (p ↔ p) ↔ p, and so on, indefinitely. In Tarski’s semantic hierar-
chy, making all the appropriate linguistic and meta-linguistic relativizations explicit,
we would need to write out these presumed truth-functional logical equivalences as:
p ↔Li p, (p ↔Li p) ↔L j p, ((p ↔Li p) ↔L j p) ↔Lk p, etc., indefinitely.
The implication is that for Tarski there can be no single univocal higher-level meta-
language in which to attribute truth to all of these equivalences. In a sense, therefore,
we cannot reach high enough to capture a meta-language that serves all of these equi-
valences to p in a single univocal truth predication, since each biconditional takes us
another step higher, even though p itself belongs to a lower-level formal language,
and possibly to the object-language. Tarski nevertheless presents the truth-schemata
using truth functions defined by means of truth conditions involving truth values with
blithe unconcern, as though in the cases of sentential connectives there was no need
to worry about the relativization of truth that he otherwise insists must be observed in
order to avoid logical antinomy. Tarski could circumvent the limitation only by impos-
ing a univocal biconditional truth function that does not need to be relativized to any
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specific object- or meta-language, but stands outside of all of them simply by virtue
of being a part of a general logic. Such a stipulation on Tarski’s part, unfortunately,
would not only be inconsistent with Tarski’s hierarchy of truth-predication languages,
but would introduce precisely the vicious circularity in the use of truth-defined truth
functions like the biconditional to explicate the concept of truth in a formalized
language such as symbolic logic.11
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